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Defamation Publication Revisited: The
Development of the Doctrine of Self-Publication
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of one's reputation has been recognized for centuries.
Shakespeare once wrote, "[He] [w]ho steals my purse steals trash;... [b]ut he
that filches from me my good name [r]obs me of that which not enriches him,
[a]nd makes me poor indeed." ' The law of defamation recognizes that "[e]very
man's reputation is as sacred as his property," 2 and a person's reputation is
protected by holding a speaker liable for false and defamatory utterances
communicated to third persons.3 The New York Tnes Co. v. Sullivan decision
thirty years ago constitutionalized the law of defamation, and as a result,
development in the area has focused on the constitutional implications of the
tort.4 However, the evolution of defamation's common-law elements
continues;5 one recent development is the doctrine of compelled self-
publication. 6
Employees bring one-third of all defamation suits against employers.7
During the litigation frenzy of the last ten years, a number of state and federal
courts held that in a given instance, a plaintiff employee may maintain a cause
of action for defamation against a defendant employer despite the fact that the
plaintiff, rather than the defendant, communicated the allegedly defamatory
material to a third party.8 This cause of action is known as defamation by self-
publication.9
The typical situation in which a defamation by self-publication claim arises
is when an employee is fired for an allegedly false and defamatory reason and
the discharged employee is forced to repeat the false and defamatory reason to
1 WILLIAM StAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act Iff, so. 3, lines 170-74
(David Bevington ed., 1988).
2 Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 381 (1878).
3 See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of the
constitutionalization of the defamation cause of action, see Sheldon W. Halpern, OfLibel,
Language, and Len: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REv. 273
(1990).
5 See infra Parts mIr-VII.
6Id.
7 Martha Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits Over Defamation, NAT'L L.J.,
May 4, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
8 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986).
9 1d.
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prospective employers during subsequent job interviews. 10 A compelled self-
publication claim is special because the injured party, the plaintiff, rather than
the defendant employer, publishes the matter to the third party.
This Comment traces the development of the doctrine of self-publication
from its common-law past to its modem treatment by courts and legislatures.
From there, the Comment explores the policies supporting a cause of action
based on self-publication and the policies working against recognition of the
doctrine." The Comment concludes by offering one possible modification of
the self-publication doctrine12 as a means of preserving free speech while
sufficiently protecting an individual's interest in his reputation.
II. DEFAMATION AND THE TRADiTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICATION
Publication of a false and defamatory statement is an essential element to a
successful claim for defamation. 13 Under the traditional approach to the
element of publication, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
communicated defamatory matter to a third party. "[T]here is ordinarily 'no
publication if the defamatory statement is exposed to a third party by the person
10 d.
11 See infra Parts iI-VII.
12 See infra Part VIII. For other discussions on the doctrine of self-publication, see
generally Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation in the Employment Disdarge Context: 7he
Emerging Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 26 DUQ. L. REv. 227 (1988); Charles S.
Murray, Jr., Compelled Self-Publication in the Employment Context: A Consistent Exception
to the Defamation Requirement of Publication, 45 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 295 (1988); S.
Olivia Mastry, Minnesota Developments, Speak No Evil: The Minnesota Supreme Court
Adopts Self-Publication Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1092 (1987); Michael A. Rataj, Note, The Doctrine of Self
Publication, 1989 DET. C.L. REv. 197 (1989); Laurance Shore, Comment, Defamation and
Employment Relationships: The New Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and
Privilege, 38 EMORYL.J. 871 (1989).
13 To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
This Comment will not focus on the constitutionalization of the law of defamation. For
a discussion of defamation's constitutionalization, see Halpern, supra note 4.
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claiming to be defamed."' 14 Thus, under the common law, a claim for
defamation is unavailable to a discharged employee who communicates the
defamatory, employer-given reason for termination to a third party during
subsequent job interviews. 15
I[[. THE LEwis DECISION
In 1986, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized an exception to the rigid
common-law requirement of publication. In Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States,16 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that under
certain circumstances a communication of a false and defamatory matter by the
injured party to a third party will satisfy the element of publication. 17 By
allowing the plaintiff publishers' claims, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
became the first state supreme court to recognize an exception to the traditional
common-law publication requirement.' 8
The plaintiffs in Lewis were at-will employees of the defendant. Without
any previous business travel experience, the plaintiffs were sent on a business
trip with monetary expense advances. 19 When the employees returned from the
trip, the employer requested that the plaintiffs submit expense reports itemizing
their expenditures. 20 Each plaintiff completed the requisite report according to
14 j. Crew Group, Inc. v. Griffin, No. 98 Civ. 2663 (KC), 1990 WL 193918 at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1990) (citing Burger v. Health Ins. Plan, 684 F. Supp. 46, 52
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)); see also Murray, supra note 12, at 299, for a discussion of Shepard v.
Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914) (explaining that defendant is not liable for
defamation after the plaintiff communicated to third parties statements that the defendant
Kld communicated only to the plaintiff).
15 Id. This remains the approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions. Most
jurisdictions, however, will recognize the claim when a plaintiff is unaware of the contents
of a statement because of some type of incapacity and discloses that statement to a third
party. See infra Part IV.A. A number of other jurisdictions have adopted a self-publication
rule based on the likelihood or compulsion of republication. See infra Part IV.B.
16 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986).
17 Id. The plaintiffs also brought successful breach of contract claims against the
defendant. Id. at 884. For an analysis of a possible modification of the at-will doctrine in
Minnesota as an alternative to the compelled self-publication doctrine, see Mastry, supra
note 12, at 1114-17.
18 Commentators have suggested that this decision was consistent with a slow
development of the law away from the rigidity of the traditional publication requirement.
Murray, supra note 12.
19 Le;ls, 389 N.W.2d at 881.
20 Id.
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the actual expenses that each incurred.21 The defendant, however, repeatedly
asked the plaintiffs to alter these reports and to incur certain expenses. 22
After altering the reports twice, the plaintiffs refused to change the reports
a third time.23 Each plaintiff asserted that the expenses were accurately
documented. 24 The refusal to alter the expense reports resulted in the
termination of each plaintiff for "gross insubordination." 25
After unsuccessfully looking for new jobs, the plaintiffs sued their previous
employer for defamation. 26 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant defamed
them by wrongfully terminating each plaintiff for gross insubordination when it
was foreseeable that the plaintiffs would be forced to divulge the "false"
reasons for their terminations to prospective employers. 27
Absent from the pleadings were allegations that the defendant directly
published the allegedly defamatory matter to a third party.28 The only evidence
of a communication to a third party was the plaintiffs' own communication to
prospective employers. 29 Notwithstanding the apparent lack of publication, the
court found that the plaintiffs had stated sufficient claims for defamation. The
court held that "[i]n an action for defamation, the publication requirement may
be satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defamatory statement
to a third person if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would
be so compelled." 30 The court emphasized that the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' harm was the defendant's statement, therefore, it was reasonable to
hold the defendant liable.31
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 886.
27 Id.
28 The defendant claimed that statements made indicating that the plaintiffs had been
terminated for gross insubordination were true. Therefore, the employer argued that the
falsity element of defamation could not be satisfied. Id. at 888. The court, however, decided
that of greatest importance was whether the fair implication of the statement was true
instructing that the relevant inquiry on the issue of truth or falsity is whether the plaintiffs
engaged in gross insubordination, not whether the actual reason given for termination was
gross insubordination. Id. at 889.
29 Id. at 886-89.
30 Id. at 888.
31 Id.
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IV. DOCTRINE AND Irs FOUNDATIONS
The Lewis decision was the first state supreme court decision supporting
the doctrine of self-publication. Accordingly, it is the most cited decision
providing an exception to the rigid rule of publication. However, the Lewis
decision has its foundation in a number of lower court decisions.32 Courts have
recognized a foreseeable republication exception to the defamation publication
requirement for nearly one hundred years. 33 Traditionally, however, courts
have not applied the exception to situations in which a discharged employee has
disclosed to prospective employers defamatory statements made to the
employee at the time of his termination.34
A. The Unmvareness Exception
Section 577 of the Restatement of Torts sets forth the oldest exception to
the general rule that a defamatory remark must be published to someone other
than the defamed person in order to state a cause of action. Comment m states:
One who communicates defamatory matter directly to the defamed person,
who himself communicates it to a third person, has not published the matter to
the third person if there are no other circumstances. If the defamed person's
transmission of the communication to the third person was made, however,
without an awareness of the defamatory nature of the matter and if the
circumstances indicated that communication to a third party would be likely, a
publication may properly be held to have occurred. 3 5
Accordingly, courts recognize an "unawareness" exception to the need for
publication, which states that publication has occurred when the original
speaker of the statement has reason to believe that a third person will hear and
understand the defamatory statement, before the defamed party is informed of
32 In Le is, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited cases from six other jurisdictions
supporting its decision. Id. at 886 (citing McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. App.
1946); Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d
389 (Mich. App. 1969); Bretz v. Mayer, 203 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio App. 1963); First State
Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
33 Murray, supra note 12, at 297-98.
34 Id.
35 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OFTORTS § 577 cmt. m (1977) (emphasis added).
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the statement's defamatory content.36 For example, courts have found that
when a blind plaintiff asks a third person to read a letter addressed to the blind
person, and the contents of the letter are unknown to the blind person, then the
publication requirement is satisfied when the letter is read by the third
person.37 In the example, the exception is based on the plaintiff's unawareness
of the defamatory nature of the matter as the writer of the letter did not directly
publish the defamatory matter to a third person. Traditionally, however, this
exception has been limited to nonemployment settings.38
B. Negligent Publication: The Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication
In addition to the unawareness exception, two formulations of self-
publication with awareness have eroded the common-law publication
requirement. 39 Although interpretations of the comment differ, comment k of
the Restatement of Torts, section 577, explains the law of those jurisdictions
that allow an exception to the common-law publication requirement without a
showing of unawareness. The comment states:
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be
intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an
unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third
person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent
36 See Lane v. Shilling, 279 P. 267 (Or. 1929) (finding a letter containing defamatory
matter about the person to whom it was addressed actionable because, by reason of that
addressee's blindness, the writer had reason to believe that the letter the blind person
received would be read by the addressee's wife); see also Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 47 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1943); Rumney v. Worthley, 71 N.E. 316 (Mass. 1904);
Wilcox v. Moon, 24 A. 244 (Vt. 1892).
37 See generally Bander, 47 N.E.2d at 595; Rwnney, 71 N.E. at 316; Shilling, 279 P.
at 267; Wilcox, 24 A. at 244.
38 A federal court sitting in a diversity suit has suggested that a less generous view of
the doctrine be applied. Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The
court, finding support in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577, cmt. m, suggested that
the originator of the defamatory material should be liable for compelled republication only
where such republication was made without awareness of the defamatory nature of the
matter. Mandelblatt, 683 F. Supp. at 386. "However, ... [the Mandelblatt] court found
that the facts of the case before it did not lend themselves to a self-defamation claim and
refrained from deciding whether the emerging doctrine, as [modified] or otherwise, would
be consistent with New York law." Weldy v. Piedmont, No. 90 Civ. 2663 (KC), 1989 WL
158342, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 985 F.2d 57 (2d. Cir.
1993).
39 Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1988) (en bane).
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communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional
communication. 4 0
The text of comment k explains that conduct which creates an unreasonable
risk that the defamatory matter will be conveyed to one other than the defamed
person amounts to publication.41 The comment has been interpreted in two
ways. Both interpretations hold the defendant liable for certain foreseeable self-
publication. 42 One approach imposes liability if it was foreseeable that the
plaintiff was likely to repeat the statement. 43 The other approach "imposes
liability if the defendant knew or could have foreseen that the plaintiff would be
compelled to repeat the defamatory statement. "44
The Lewis court chose the "foreseeable compulsion" exception. 45 Under
this approach, it is not enough for it to be foreseeable that the allegedly
defamatory matter will likely be republished by the defamed party; it must be
foreseeable that the plaintiff will be under "strong compulsion" to republish the
statement, and a situation must have arisen in which the plaintiff was actually
compelled to republish the statement. 46
In practice, any distinction between these two exceptions may be trivial.
The difference may only be whether a court focuses on the foreseeability
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977).
41 Churdwy, 759 P.2d at 1344.
42Id.
43 See Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, No. 90 Civ. 2663 (KC), 1989 WL 158342, *5-6
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 985 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 1993); Elmore v.
Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Poison v. Davis, 635 F. Supp.
1130, 1147 (D. Kan. 1986); McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Colonial
Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d 306, 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946); Belcher v. Little, 315
N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886-88 (Minn. 1986).
44 See Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 389, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Neighbors
v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 444-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985);
First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 695, 701-02 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
45 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
886-88 (Minn. 1986).
46 In choosing this approach, the court in Lewis relied heavily on the decision in
McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). In McKinney,
the court held that where "circumstances which create the strong compulsion are known to
the originator of the defamatory statement at the time he communicates it to the person
defamed," a cause of action for libel or slander can be maintained. McKinney, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 94.
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requirement or focuses on the compulsion requirement. 47 What is important,
however, is that many courts will recognize a cause of action for foreseeable
self-publication.48
V. POLICIES SUPPORTING THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT AND THOSE
SUPPORTING THE EXCEPTIONS
A. Threat of Silence: The Policy Behind a Rigid Publication
Requirement
What factors support a rigid publication requirement? Of course, there is
some notion of fairness: "Why should I be liable if you communicated the
defamatory matter to someone else and, as a result, suffered injury?" Putting
aside any notion of fairness, however, there is a more compelling rationale for
a rigid publication requirement. As noted earlier, many defamation actions are
brought against employers. 49 While the doctrine of self-publication may have
limited application in other settings, its primary application is in the employer-
employee context.50 Those who oppose adoption of the self-publication
doctrine fear that the threat of employer liability it poses will discourage
communication between employers and employees. 51
47 Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1988) (en bane).
48 Supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. For courts refusing to recognize the
doctrine, see DeLeone v. Saint Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 825 (1989) (rejecting the self-publication doctrine in hiring circumstances
because this theory might visit liability for defamation on every Maryland employer each
time a job applicant is rejected); Sarratore v. Longview Van Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1257,
1263 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding judicial landmarks too unclear to presume that the state of
Indiana would adopt the controversial doctrine of self-publication); Yetter v. Ward Trucking
Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (granting an absolute privilege to
employers in their communication with employees and effectively eviscerating the cause of
action for compelled self-publication).
49 Middleton, supra note 7, at 1, col. 4.
50 For examples, see Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo.
1988) (en bane); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 886-88 (Minn. 1986); cf. Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1982)
(pertaining to slander of title).
51 For courts that have failed to recognize such self-publication doctrines see supra
note 48. For a discussion of statutory reactions to the threat of such social costs, see infra
text accompanying Part VII.
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1. Reasons for Employer Silence
The recognition of a new cause of action for self-publication will likely
increase the number of defamation suits brought against employers. Even if
successful on the merits, employers will be burdened by having to defend
against defamation actions based on the doctrine of self-publication. Moreover,
the threat of negative publicity accompanies most defamation suits. 52 The risks
of litigation and bad publicity may push employers into taking "vows of
silence." 53 In short, recognizing a self-publication cause of action may
discourage employer communication with employees. The social costs of such
silence outweigh the individual rewards or possible legal reprisals. 54
2. The Harm to Employees from Employer Silence
Employer silence may harm an employee's economic and occupational
status by causing employees to lose the advantage of a positive reference in
their search for new employment. In fact, it is not hard to imagine situations in
which an employer's refusal to give a reference for a discharged employee
would have a negative impact on the employee's prospective employment
chances. 55 A prospective employer may draw a negative inference from the fact
that a previous employer refused to give a recommendation for the candidate.
Employees may also be harmed by not being provided with information
concerning the employee's work output as measured against the performance of
fellow employees or industry standards. Whether in a present position or in a
future job, information enables individuals to improve their own capabilities
and work environment.56 Such improvements are essential to promotions and
increased worker productivity, which may result in higher wages for all
employees.
Employer silence carries with it certain psychological costs as well. It is
recognized that work gives employees psychological satisfaction. 57 Uncertainty
surrounding a recent termination may leave terminated employees emotionally
distressed with scars affecting the employees' relationships at home and in
52 See Shore, supra note 12, at 873.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. "An employer's unwillingness to provide a recommendation may also imply a
negative reference and thus provoke a defamation suit." Id. at 874 n.19 (citing Tyler v.
Macks Stores of S.C., Inc., 272 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 1980)).
56 Shore, supra note 12, at 873.
57 See David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 119, 129-30 (1980).
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future employment. Furthermore, employees who continue to work after the
employer has discharged fellow employees may work in a paranoid state-
distracted, disgruntled, and unable to concentrate because of uncertainty about
which behavior warrants termination.
3. The Harm to Employers from Silence
Employers may also be harmed by the "chilling effect" of recognition of
the doctrine of self-publication, at least as it is presently recognized. If
employees do not know the cause of their termination, prospective employers
probably will not know. As a result, employers may hire those who are ill-
suited for a position or refuse to hire those that are well-suited because a
previous employer has adopted a policy of refusing to give work references.
Some authority supports the idea that a mere firing is a statement which
may be actionable.58 Thus, a potential suit may exist when a person is fired and
is not told the reason for the firing. If the termination followed an
administrative meeting, disciplinary meeting, or investigation that the plaintiff
attended, a claim of compelled self-publication may exist based on the content
of such meeting.59 If the discharged employee was not given a reason for his
termination, it is possible that the discharged employee, in his search for new
employment, will be compelled to discuss the circumstances surrounding his
recent departure or termination. When an employee is forced to disclose
statements made at a investigatory hearing or other meeting, the employee may
have an actionable self-publication claim.
Thus, in order to avoid the risk of litigation and liability, employers may
choose to terminate expendable employees, rather than investigate alleged
problems. This protects employers by making the circumstances surrounding a
termination too ambiguous to warrant a finding that the plaintiff was likely to
or was compelled to disclose the circumstances of his termination. As a
consequence, this approach will harm the employer who terminates an
"innocent," productive employee, and it will harm the innocent employee by
putting him out of work. The employer's risk assessment, however, may lead
him to conclude that it is more economical to replace an employee rather than
risk the potential harm a self-publication claim may present.
58 See Rumpel v. Bank of Buffalo, No. Civ-88-628E, 1992 WL 50176 (Wis. Ct. App.
Jan. 22, 1992).
59 See Ritter v. Pepsi Cola Operating Co., 785 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (basing a
claim for self-publication on circumstances surrounding plaintiffs resignation).
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In light of the apparent threats to employers, universities, realtors, and
others to whom the self-publication doctrine may apply, the doctrine of self-
publication, in its present form, is too costly for society, to recognize.
B. The Rationale for Self-Publication Defamation
How do the courts defend their acceptance of the doctrine of self-
publication? The decision is often grounded on notions of proximate causation.
The rationale for making the originator of a defamatory statement liable for its
foreseeable republication is the strong causal link between the actions of the
originator and the damage caused by the republication. This causal link is no
less strong where the foreseeable republication is made by the person defamed
operating under a strong compulsion to republish the defamatory statement and
the circumstances which create the strong compulsion are known to the
originator of the defamatory statement at the time he communicates it to the
person defamed." 60
Undoubtedly there are times, when a person compelled to republish
defamatory matter about himself will be injured because of the republication.
Whether it is the prospective employee looking for a job, the fired employee
likely to or compelled to tell his wife that he was wrongly fired for sexual
harassment, or the student wrongly expelled from one school applying to a new
institution, a false statement impugning one's character or ability causes
harm.61 Furthermore, courts that recognize an exception to the common-law
rule of publication are concerned not only with compensating injury, but also
with encouraging truthful communication. Courts adhering to this standard
explain that an employee's "only choice would be to [tell the truth] or to lie.
Fabrication, however, is an unacceptable alternative." 62
A student of torts might think that under today's negligence standards a
self-publication claim would be available other than under the limited
unawareness exception. 63 Ironically, however, very few jurisdictions have
recognized another exception.64 Most courts only recognize the unawareness
60 Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1986) (en bane)
(citing McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 94-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
61 Outside the context of a previously fired employee interviewing with a prospective
employer, it is uncertain how far the doctrine of self-publication can reach.
62 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
888 (Minn. 1986).
63 Id.
64 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. For jurisdictions choosing not to
adopt a doctrine of self-publication, see supra note 48.
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exception to the rigid publication rule.65 However, to require unawareness in
all circumstances eviscerates the cause of action developed by the Lewis and
McKinney courts. 66
A predicate requirement that a plaintiff be unaware of the defamatory
nature of the statements he is compelled to republish, would completely destroy
the Lewis cause of action in many situations. The unawareness requirement
ignores notions of proximate causation in most situations. 67 A self-publication
defamation action based on "unawareness" is not merely a "'less generous'
cause of action . . but an effectively eviscerated one . . . [because][a] rule
requiring the plaintiff's ignorance of the veracity of such statements at the
time... [of publication] ignore[s] practical reality." 68 In a situation in which a
self-publication cause of action appears to be appropriate, the plaintiff, better
than anyone, will know the substance and the truth of a statement concerning
him.69 For example, a student applying to a new college knows whether or not
his expulsion from a previous school was justified because of alleged cheating.
VI. JUDICIAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE EMPLOYER EVEN WHEN THE
DOCTRINE OF SELF-PUBLICATION IS RECOGNIZED
Given the threat that the self-publication doctrine poses to free
communication in the workplace, limits have been placed on the doctrine. The
requirements of foreseeability, 70 and compulsion 71 may offer some protection
to employers against liability in a self-publication suit.72
65 Lane v. Shilling, 279 P. 267 (Or. 1929).
66 Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, No. 90 Civ. 2663 (KC), 1989 WL 158342, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 985 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 1993).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at *6. ("Inevitably, in employment discharge cases . . . the plaintiff will be
aware of the veracity of any rationales relating to his conduct or non-conduct on the job.").
70 In the employment setting, the requirements of foreseeability for likely or compelled
publication will be easy to meet because most people are forced to search for employment
after being terminated. There are circumstances, however, in which the courts have held
that it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff would republish the statements. J. Crew Group,
Inc. v. Griffin, No. 90 Civ. 2663 (KC), 1990 WL 193918, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1990)
(holding that the defendant could not foresee that the plaintiff would be compelled to
republish the defamatory contents of a letter when the defendant instructed the plaintiff to
offer an explanation to others that his termination was needed in order to carry out a change
in corporate direction). Further, it probably is not foreseeable that the defendant will be
compelled or even likely to divulge reasons for being denied employment. But see DeLeone
v. Saint Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825 (1989).
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As a means of minimizing the threat of "chilling speech," a qualified
privilege also accompanies the recognition of the self-publication doctrine.
71 The compulsion requirement can be difficult to overcome, especially outside the
employment setting. See Mastry, supra note 12, at 1101 n.46. Mastry compares various
levels of compulsion, one of which includes the notion of "likely to republish."
Those jurisdictions that recognize self-publication defamation... have required
different levels of compulsion to satisfy the element of the tort. Compare
McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 795, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (requiring that plaintiffs show
they were acting under strong compulsion) with Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696
S.W.2d 439, 445 ('ex. Ct. App. 1985) (Defendant as a reasonably prudent person
should have expected that plaintiff would repeat the defamation to others).
Mastry, supra note 12, at 1101 n.46.
Critics of this approach have complained that the compulsion element is too easily
satisfied, and thus will give rise to numerous claims. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 896 (Minn. 1986) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
There are, however, a number of cases finding the opposite. See Pfluger v. Southview
Chevrolet Co., 967 F.2d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir. 1992) (informing coworkers and "anyone
who would ask" of reasons for dismissal is not compelled self-publication); J. Crew, 1990
WL 193918, at *4-5 (Plaintiff "cannot have been compelled when, without being dishonest,
he could have simply repeated the [non-defamatory] reason proposed by his employer. This
alternative obviated [plaintiff's] need to republish the defamatory statements."); Mandelblatt
v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that there is no
compulsion to tell a job search consultant that a suit challenging defendant's allegations of
termination "for cause" has been instituted); cf Bretz v. Mayer, 203 N.E.2d 665, 670-71
(Ohio 1960) (holding that a pastor had a duty to reveal to church officials imminent dangers
and defaming statements made to the plaintiff in a letter addressed to the plaintiff which
allegedly defamed the plaintiff).
Foreseeability of likely disclosure or foreseeable compulsion is not enough to warrant
recovery of damages. As in any defamation action, there must be communication to a third
party. That is, in a self-publication action there must be evidence the plaintiff was actually
forced to reveal the alleged defamatory statements to a third party; mere speculation is not
enough. Roles v. Boeing Military Planes, 1990 WL 110255, at *6 (D. Kan. 1990), af'd,
951 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1991).
72 There may be times when the requirement of compulsion is preferred and carries
much greater weight than a simple foreseeability test. Langvardt, supra note 12, at 279-80.
As Langvardt suggests, "[flor instance, it may be foreseeable to the defendant that the
plaintiff would repeat, to his relatives or friends, the defendant's statements. It is
questionable, however, whether there was any particular compulsion for the repetition to
such persons." Id. at 279 n.296; see also Fieser v. University of Minn., No. C5-91-1592,
1992 WL 15582, at *2, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1992) (explaining that the doctrine of
compelled self-publication was not applicable because there were no allegations that the
plaintiff was asked by prospective employers the reason for her discharge).
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(requiring verification of the fees by an independent auditor)73 The originator of the
false and defamatory statement will not be liable for damages if the
circumstances make the communication conditionally privileged, and the
privilege is not abused.74 The court in Lewis explained:
The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy
considerations. As other jurisdictions recognize, the existence of a privilege
results from the court's determination that statements made in particular
contexts or on certain occasions should be encouraged despite the risk that the
statements might be defamatory. 75
Absolute privileges do exist but generally do not arise in the employment
termination context,76 and they are available only in limited numbers of other
circumstances.77
The Lewis court recognized a qualified privilege because it, "seem[ed] to
be the only effective means of addressing the concern that every time an
employer states the reason for discharging an employee it will subject itself to
potential liability .... [U]nless a significant privilege is recognized by the
courts, employers will decline to inform employees of reasons for
discharges." 78 Because the same statements would have been privileged if the
employer had directly stated them to the plaintiffs' prospective employers, it
was logically consistent to grant an employer a qualified privilege for
statements made to the plaintiffs that were then published to a prospective
73 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
889 (Minn. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 593 (1977).
74 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889.
75 Id.
[A] communication, to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion, from a
proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause. When so made
in good faith, the law does not imply malice from the communication itself, as in the
ordinary case of libel. Actual malice must be proved, before there can be a recovery.
Id.
76 Langvardt, supra note 12, at 238.
77 The Restatement of Torts lists a number of the absolute privileges, sometimes
referred to as immunities: judicial officers, section 585; parties to judicial proceedings,
section 587; attorneys at law, section 586; and publication required by law, section 592. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS §§ 585-92 (1977).
78 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
890 (Minn. 1986).
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employer by the plaintiffs. 79 It is questionable, however, whether such a
consistency argument was required. Any discussions with an employee
concerning his work or his ability is a proper occasion for the application of a
qualified privilege.80
A. Loss of the Privilege
By definition, a conditional or qualified privilege does not grant absolute
protection. 8' A -privilege is lost if it is abused. A qualified privilege can be
abused: (1) by excessive publication or by publication of matter that is not
necessary to further the interest at stake; (2) by communicating false and
defamatory matters to someone whose receipt of the statement is not reasonably
necessary for the furtherance of such an interest;82 or (3) by acting with malice
in making a false and defamatory statement.8 3
Courts generally apply two standards when determining whether the
defendant acted with the requisite malice needed to abuse a qualified privilege.
Courts in most jurisdictions apply the common-law, ill-will malice standard.
This standard focuses on the attitude of the defendant in making the false and
defamatory statement.84
The "actual" or "constitutional" malice standard has also been applied in a
few jurisdictions in determining whether or not the defendant has abused a
conditional privilege.85 This standard was established in New York Tmes Co.
v. Sullivan86 as a means of ensuring constitutional protection for speech
79 Id.
80 For a discussion of common-law privileges for defamatory communications, see
Kevin T. Baine & Chad E. Milton, Conon Law Privileges For Defamatory Communica-
dons, in LBEL LrriGATIoN 1992, at 39 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 338, 1992).
81 Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1024-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(recognizing an absolute privilege for an employer to communicate with employees in
Pennsylvania, and thus not allowing a claim for compelled self-publication to arise in
Pennsylvania in the employer-employee context).
82 Langvardt, supra note 12, at 240.
83 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 398 N.W.2d 876,
890 (Minn. 1986).
84 Id. If this is the proper standard, then it is questionable whether the use of the phrase
"negligent publication" is the appropriate term in self-publication exceptions. The
Restatement uses the term negligent publication. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 577 cmt. k (1977).
85 See Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 366 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Rumpel v.
Bank of Buffalo, No. Civ-88-628E, 1992 WL 50176 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1992).
86 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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concerning "public figures." Under the "actual malice" standard, the focus is
not on the attitude of the defendant. The relevant focus of the "actual" or
"constitutional malice" standard is on the knowledge or subjective awareness of
the defendant as "to the truth or falsity of the allegedly false and defamatory
statement.87 These are very strict standards for the plaintiff; proving attitude,
knowledge, or subjective awareness is difficult.
B. Prohibition of Punitive Damages
Concerned with the problems of mitigation of damage and unreasonable
burdens on employers, the Lewis court sought to minimize the threat of chilling
speech in the employment context, while at the same time recognizing and
justifying liability of employers for foreseeable compelled self-publication. 88
Relying on Minnesota's punitive damages statute, which prohibited punitive
damages in new causes of action, the court prohibited the granting of punitive
damages in compelled self-publication cases by holding that the tort was a
"significant new basis for maintaining a cause of action." 89 The prohibition on
punitive damages was viewed as a protection for employers against a plaintiff's
intentional failure to mitigate damages. However, because the Lewis court
based the restriction primarily on its interpretation of a statute, the prohibition
against the award of punitive damages may be limited to Minnesota and other
jurisdictions with similar punitive damage statutes.
VII. STATUTORY RESPONSES
In Colorado and Minnesota, the only states in which the highest courts
have adopted the doctrine of self-publication in the employment setting, the
legislatures have responded by banning or restricting its application. 90 It is
uncertain whether these responses are due to general societal disfavor or are the
result of a strong employer lobby.
87 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986).
89 Id. at 891-92 (recognizing MNIN. STAT. section 549.20 (1986) as a piece of
legislation designed to limit the use of punitive damages and to codify only existing case law
pertaining to punitive damages awards).
90 COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-125.5 (1993); MINN. STAT. § 181.931-.935 (1987).
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A. Colorado
In response to judicial recognition of the doctrine of self-publication by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.,91 the Colorado
state legislature recently enacted Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-25-
125.5. The statute states:
No action for libel or slander may be brought or maintained unless the party
charged with such defamation has published, either orally or in writing, the
defamatory statement to a person other than the person making the allegation of
libel or slander. Self-publication, either orally or in writing, of the defamatory
statement to a third person by the person making such allegation shall not give
rise to a claim for libel or slander against the person who originally
communicated the defamatory statement.92
Thus, a self-publication claim for defamation is unavailable in Colorado
without exception.
B. Minnesota
The legislature in Minnesota reacted in a similar fashion, although it is
probable that Minnesota has not completely barred the cause of action for self-
publication. The Minnesota statute's effect is to restrict some, but not all,
discharged employees from bringing a cause of action based on the doctrine of
self-publication. 93
If an involuntarily discharged employee makes a written request within five
working days of the discharge for the reason supporting the discharge, the
Minnesota statute requires the employer to provide a discharged employee with
a written statement.94 The written statement must include the "truthful reason"
for the termination. 95 Further, the statute states that "[n]o communication of
the statement96 furnished by the employer to the employee. . . may be made
91 79 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
92 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-125.5 (1993) (emphasis added).
93 MINN. STAT. §§ 181.931-.935 (1987). For analysis of the statute see generally
Langvardt, supra note 12 and text accompanying note 12.
9 4 MINN. STAT. § 181.933 (1987).
95 Id.
96 Statement refers to a truthful written statement. Truthful most likely requires giving
the actual reason for discharge, but it is not based upon the merit, validity, or veracity of
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the subject of any action for libel, slander, or defamation by the employee
against the employer." 97
Although the Minnesota statute has effectively curtailed the use of the
doctrine of self-publication, "it would not be wise to conclude that Lewis has
been legislatively overruled.",98 Of course, if the requirements of the statute are
met, a discharged employee cannot sue for self-publication defamation.
Arguably, however, the statute fails to abolish the cause of action completely.
For instance, the statute does not address situations in which a nonemployee is
compelled to republish a defamatory statement concerning himself or herself,
nor does it address slander of title99 cases nor statements made by educational
institutions.
Circumstances still exist in which the statute does not overrule the decision
in Lewis with respect to the employment setting.100
The compelled self-publication doctrine of Lewis should remain available for
discharged employee[s] [who meet the requirements of defamation and the test
for compelled self-publication]. Among such situations would be those
involving statements comparable to the following: (1.) a statement by the
employer, to the discharged employee, of the reason for the employment
termination, without the employee's having requested such statement pursuant
to the statute (meaning that the statement was not what hereinafter will be
referred to as a "statutory statement"); (2.) a statement by the employer, again
to the discharged employee, with such statement being separate and apart from
a statutory statement; (3.) a statement that ostensibly was a statutory statement
but did not contain the "truthful" reason for the termination; and, (4.) a
statutory statement that went beyond such "truthful" reason and mentioned
other matters. 1 0 1
the given truthful reason. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986).
97 MINN. STAT. § 181.933 (1987).
98 Langvardt, supra note 12, at 251.
99 Slander of title is defined as: "A false or malicious statement, oral or written,
made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, or of some
right of his causing him special damage." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1388 (6th ed.
1990).
100.Langvardt, supra note 12, at 251.
101 Id. at 252.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Minimizing Liability of Employers
The requirements of compulsion, privileges, and limitations on punitive
damages are attempts to minimize the threat of self-publication claims. These
attempts represent the recognition that open communication is beneficial to
society and that the threat of liability could chill all speech in certain settings,
not simply the defamatory speech. Regardless of the malice standard or
unavailability of punitive damages, however, ad hoe protections are not enough
to minimize the chilled speech effects caused by recognition of defamation by
self-publication. Because of the risk of litigation, the best advice an attorney
can give to a client employer is that the employer refrain from providing
employees with reasons for discharge and work related recommendations.
Silence eliminates almost all risks of liability from self-publication defamation
for the employer. Furthermore, employers may mitigate the anxiety of the
remaining employees by directing managers to assure the remaining employees
in the same department that they are properly performing their jobs, and to
inform the remaining employees of any improvements that need to be made.
Attorneys, acting in the best interest of the client should advocate employer
silence. As a result, however, society as a whole may suffer.
B. A Proposed Modification to the Doctrine of Compelled Self-
Publication
1. A Proposed Statutory Definition
The doctrine of compelled self-publication has not been adopted
everywhere, nor has the question been addressed in every jurisdiction. If the
doctrine is to be recognized in the employment setting, the only means of
ensuring open communication while protecting an employee's reputation from
false and defamatory utterances is to define the cause of action by statute. The
statute should require a discharging employer to give a requesting employee the
truthful reason 02 for the employee's discharge, yet it should also grant the
employer or institution a qualified privilege that may be overridden by either
ill-will or constitutional malice.103 To ensure that all employers do not
terminate employees suspected of wrongdoing rather than determining the
102 Truthful as defined supra note 96.
103 Langvardt offered a similar proposal showing what would be required in order to
abuse the privilege. Langvardt, supra note 12, at nn.58-64 and accompanying text.
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veracity of their suspicions, the statute should require an investigation in certain
defined instances. 104 Under this type of statute, an employer failing to conduct
a required investigation would be subject to a determinable civil fine payable to
the individual employee.
Further, under this statute, employers would retain the power to discharge
a person, for any reason or no reason. Yet, the employer should be required to
give a reason for the discharge105 and, in certain defined instances, to conduct
a "minimum" investigation106 to ensure the discharge is reasonably based in
fact. This will ensure against unwarranted harm to an employee's reputation,
and it will prevent employers, in certain circumstances, from simply firing all
employees suspected of any wrongdoing.
Even when the investigation is unreasonable, employers should not be
subject to liability for defamation on the basis of negligence. Absent ill-will or
constitutional malice, the qualified privilege should still protect the employer.
The employer should only be held liable for a statutory civil penalty, paid to
the plaintiff, for intentionally or willfully conducting an unreasonable
investigation or not conducting one at all. If the penalty is a progressive penalty
for repeat offenders, employers will fulfill their minimum required duties.
Accordingly, the at-will rule will not be significantly altered by the statute, nor
will negligent conduct on the part of the employer be encouraged. An employer
will continue to be entitled to terminate an employee for any reason so long as
he gives the truthful reason for such termination. 10 7 A showing of ill-will,
malice or constitutional malice would still overcome the privilege because
neither a maliciously acting party, nor a knowledgeable or subjectively aware
party should escape liability for his actions. Most important, the statute should
only remain in effect for a maximum of five years. At the end of five years the
legislature should study the impacts of the statute and determine if the statute
and the doctrine of self-publication are desirable restrictions on employer
speech and conduct.
2. Liability Under the Proposed Statute
Under the hypothetical statute, liability would only be imposed in the
following circumstances: (1) a defendant intentionally acting with ill-will
104 Situations lending themselves to an investigation into the veracity of the charge
would arise when a person is suspected of stealing, cheating, or sexual harassment.
105 Even if the reason for discharge is that the employee was fired for no other
reason than the employer wanted to fire a random person that day.
106 No investigation will be required if an employee is fired for a reason other
than suspected misconduct.
107 See supra note 105.
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toward the plaintiff will lose any privilege and may be held liable for
defamation in a court of law; (2) a defendant acting with knowledge or reckless
disregard for the truth will lose the protection of the privilege and may be
found liable for defamation; (3) a defendant failing to conduct a minimum
reasonable investigation may be subject to civil statutory penalties for failure to
meet the statute's requirements, but cannot be found liable for defamation for
simply failing to investigate; and, (4) a defendant failing to give a reason for
the termination of an employee would be held liable for a determinable civil
fine.108
The offered modification is by no means intended to be a rejection of the
at-will doctrine or an endorsement of the doctrine of self-publication. Proposals
have been made to modify the doctrine of compelled self-publication to ensure
recovery for injury while not overly chilling speech. 109 However, these
proposals have failed to recognize that the slightest threat of liability for
defamation will cause employers to hesitate to give a reason 'for a termination,
regardless of the degree of protection offered by the elements or privileges.
Recognition of the doctrine of self-publication is yet another judicial attack on
freedom of speech. The erosion of our constitutional right to free speech has
become an unfortunate reality. If the doctrine of self-publication is accepted by
an intolerant society, steps must be taken to limit the elected judiciary's
exercise of power. Therefore, if the doctrine is to be accepted, the legislature
must step in and establish the boundaries. As one other author has warned:
Taking stock of the legal system's own limitations, we must realize that judges,
being human, will not only make mistakes but will sometimes succumb to the
pressures exerted by the government to allow restraints [on speech] that ought
not to be allowed. To guard against these possibilities we must give judges as
little room to maneuver as possible, and again, extend the boundary of the
realm of protected speech into the hinterlands of speech in order to minimize
the potential harm from judicial miscalculation and misdeeds. 110
108 Thus, employers who remain apprehensive would not run the risk of large jury
awards for defamation, but they would be subject to some statutory fine.
109 For one alternative, see Langvardt, supra note 12, at 279-92.
110 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE INToLERr SocIETY 78 (1986).
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While the doctrine of self-publication appears to be potentially useful in a
number of contexts, the doctrine infrequently arises in situations outside the
employment context.111 Therefore, freedom of speech should reign supreme
over the limited quantum of harm that results in other compelled self-
publication situations.
Geoffrey J. Moul
111 Case law on other fact situations is sparse.
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